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I.

Introduction*
A. Issues
This memorandum compares six issues relating to sexual violence trials in

the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”).

The first part of this

memorandum compares the jurisprudence of substantive sexual assaults in ICTY
and ICTR decisions. The second part compares ICTY and ICTR judgments on
superior responsibility and individual criminal responsibility for crimes of sexual
violence.

The third explores evidential procedures for minors.

The fourth

discusses the admissibility of evidence of a rape victim’s prior sexual conduct in
the Tribunals. The fifth compares sentencing issues between the Tribunals. The
sixth addresses judicial impartiality and gender bias in sexual violence trials.

B. Conclusions
The

ICTY

and

ICTR

have

substantially

humanitarian law relating to sexual violence.

expanded

international

The Tribunals have made

enormous strides just by acknowledging the role of sexual violence in ethnic

* ISSUE 25: A comparative study of sexual violence trials in the ICTY and ICTR comparing the
following issues: (a) Jurisprudence of substantive sexual assaults, particularly the new cases
after July 2001; (b) Superior responsibility/ individual criminal responsibility for sexual violence;
(c) Evidential procedures for minors; (d) Prior sexual conduct; (e) Sentencing issues; and (f)
Judicial impartiality and gender bias.
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cleansing and genocide, and by convicting defendants of individual acts of rape
and assault.

It is an excellent sign that some ICTR indictments are being

amended to include charges of sexual violence, that ICTR judges have been
increasingly willing to accept these amended indictments, and that many
pending ICTY cases also contain charges for rape and sexual offenses.2
However, there are still concerns that Tribunal investigators have not made
enough progress in interviewing victims of sexual attacks, especially at the ICTR,
and that prosecutors do not include enough charges for sexual violence.3

There

have also been many calls for stronger protective measures for witnesses, which
would increase the number of victims willing to testify in cases of sexual assault.
Also, increasing the number of female investigators and interpreters, and
training all staff to deal with rape victims in a sensitive manner, would lead to
more effective witness testimony in cases of sexual violence.
In sum, gender sensitivity and perseverance are required in order to bring the
perpetrators of rape and other sexual war crimes to justice. A more aggressive
approach to investigation, prosecution, and punishment would show that the
Tribunals recognize the seriousness of sexual violence against civilians during
armed conflicts.
See e.g., Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuto and Ntahobali, Amended Indictment, No. ICTR-97-21-I (May
26, 1997); cited by Jocelyn Campanaro, Women, War, and International Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 2557, 2565
(2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]; Prosecutor v. Meakic, Amended
Indictment, No. IT-02-65 (July 18, 2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 39.]
2

3

See e.g., Campanaro, supra note 2, at 2565.

2

C. Factual Background
The Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals were established by the mandate of
the United Nations to prosecute violations of international humanitarian law in
the territories of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.1 These violations included
widespread and systematic rapes and other forms of sexual violence against
civilians, the majority of whom were women. Thousands of women and girls in
the former Yugoslavia, as well as many men, were raped and sexually assaulted
during the Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing.

Many of these women were

confined in what were essentially rape camps, which were intended to “cleanse”
the Muslim population by forcing women to bear Serb infants.4

Likewise,

thousands of Rwandan women were targeted for rape and sexual mutilation
during the ethnic violence against Tutsi civilians.5

In both Yugoslavia and

Rwanda, women were often raped before being killed.6
Although sexual attacks against civilians have been a part of warfare and
ethnic violence for centuries, military officers who have ordered or perpetrated
Despite evidence of widespread rapes

these acts have rarely been punished.7

4

See e.g., Campanaro, supra note 2, at 2571.

See e.g., Margaret A. Lyons, Hearing the Cry Without Answering the Call: Rape, Genocide, and the
Rwandan Tribunal, 28 Syracuse J. Int’l. L. & Com. 99, 105-106 (2001). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
5

See e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Amended Indictment, No. ICTR-96-4-I (Feb. 13, 1996).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23.]
6

7

See Campanaro, supra note 2, at 2558.

3

and forced prostitution by Axis soldiers during the Second World War, neither of
the international military tribunals that convened after the war decided to
prosecute sexual assaults as independent crimes.8

The ICTY and ICTR have

been the first international tribunals to specifically address and punish sexual
violence against civilians, to the acclaim of human rights activists.

The legal

recognition of the relationship between sexual violence and ethnic cleansing in
Yugoslavia, and between sexual violence and genocide in Rwanda, has been an
enormous step forward for international justice. The Tribunals’ recent decisions
have dramatically changed the jurisprudence of sexual violence in international
humanitarian law.

The judgments of the Tribunals also suggest that the

international community finally recognizes the seriousness of rape and sexual
crimes against civilians during armed conflicts.

II. Jurisprudence of Substantive Sexual Assaults

A. Recognition of Rape and Gender Crimes
(1) Jurisdiction of the Tribunals to Prosecute Crimes of Sexual Violence
The ICTY has subject-matter jurisdiction over grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Article 2), violations of the laws or customs of war

See Campanaro, supra note 2, at 2561-2562 (referring to the International Military Tribunals at
Nuremberg and Tokyo.)
8

4

(Article 3), genocide (Article 4), and crimes against humanity (Article 5).9

The

ICTR has jurisdiction over three articles, namely, genocide (Article 2), crimes
against humanity (Article 3), and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (Article 4).10

The Tribunals’

jurisdiction in regard to crimes against humanity is circumscribed by customary
international law. 11
The ICTY Statute contains only one article that specifically mentions
sexual violence: rape as a crime against humanity.12 The ICTR Statute lists rape
as a crime against humanity as well, but also includes the sexual offenses of
“rape, enforced prostitution, and any form of indecent assault” as outrages upon
personal dignity, and hence as war crimes.13

However, the Office of the

Prosecutor has gone beyond the explicitly enumerated sexual crimes, and has
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of the International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704, Annex (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute or Yugoslav Statute]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 1.]

9

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December
1994, S.C. Res. 955, Annex, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Res. and Dec., at 15, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50
Annex (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1602 (1994), at arts. 2-4. [hereinafter ICTR Statute or
Rwandan Statute]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]

10

Guenael Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 Harv. Int’l. L.J. 237 (2002).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]

11

12

ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 5(g).

13

ICTR Statute, supra note 10, arts. 3(g) and 4(e), respectively.

5

indicted suspected sexual offenders under other articles as well.14 Depending on
the particular circumstances, an incident of rape may also constitute:

(a) a

violation of the laws or customs of war, (b) a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions, (c) torture, (d) enslavement, or (e) an element of genocide.15 The
possibility of multiple charges reflects the fact that rapes committed during an
armed conflict may have different motivations and contexts.

(2)

First ICTY and ICTR convictions for crimes of sexual violence

(a) ICTY-

Prosecutor v. Tadic

Dusko Tadic was the first person to be tried by the ICTY and was also the
first to be convicted by either Tribunal for crimes of sexual violence.16 Tadic’s
indictment alleged that he participated and assisted in the general campaign of
“killings, torture, sexual assaults, and other physical and psychological abuse”
of Muslims and Croats.17

The indictment also alleged that Tadic ordered two

male prisoners to perform sexual acts and sexual mutilation on another male

See e.g., Doris Buss, Prosecuting Mass Rape Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and
Zoran Vukovic, 10 Feminist Leg. Stud. 91, 93-94 (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 5.]
14

15

Id.

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Second Amended Indictment, No. IT-94-1-T (Dec. 14, 1995). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 18.]

16

17

Id. at paras. 4 and 4.3.

6

prisoner.18

Tadic was charged with rape,19 inhuman treatment, and cruel

treatment,20 and was additionally charged with torture or inhuman treatment,
cruel treatment, and inhumane acts for ordering the sexual mutilation.21
The Trial Chamber produced several important holdings and dicta in
Tadic relating to sexual violence. For example, Tadic’s presence at the scene of
the mutilation and abuse of the male prisoner was found sufficient to convict
him of cruel treatment.22

Also, the Trial Chamber held that a crime against

humanity must be committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack on
One concern raised by the Chamber’s

civilians for discriminatory reasons.23

decision was its ruling that discriminatory intent on the grounds of race, religion,
or politics was a required element of any crime against humanity.24 On appeal,
however, it was held that discriminatory intent was only a required element of

18

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Second Amended Indictment, supra note 16, at para. 6.

19

Id. at para. 5 (count 2 of indictment).

20

Id. (counts 3 and 4 of indictment).

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Second Amended Indictment, supra note 16, at para. 6 ( counts 8- 11 of
indictment).
21

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Chamber I, Opinion and Judgment, No. IT-94-1-T (May 7, 1997), at
para. 726. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19.]
22

23

Id. at para. 730.

24

Id. at paras. 694-713.

7

Article 5(h), crimes against humanity (persecution), and that crimes committed
for purely personal reasons could also constitute crimes against humanity.25
Another important decision was the Trial Chamber’s ruling that
customary international law imposes “direct individual criminal responsibility
and personal culpability for assisting, aiding and abetting, or participating in a
criminal... act.”26

The chamber therefore held Tadic individually criminally

responsible for the acts of others, opening the door for other low-ranking
military officers to be prosecuted under similar circumstances. 27
An important procedural decision to come out of the Tadic judgment was
the ruling that no corroboration would be needed for the testimony of rape
victims.28 The Chamber upheld Rule 96(I) of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence,29 which states that the testimony of rape victims will not be subject to
the requirement of corroboration.30

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Judgment, No. IT-94-1 (July 15, 1999), at 327. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
25

26

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, supra note 22, at para. 666.

27

Id. at paras. 667-690.

28

Id. at para. 536.

29

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of the
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 96, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994), amended by U.N.
Doc. IT/32/Rev.10 (1996). [hereinafter ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence or ICTY
Rules.] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]

30

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, supra note 22, at para. 536.

8

The Trial Chamber’s judgment in Tadic gave important judicial
acknowledgment to the role that sexual violence played in the wider campaign
of ethnic cleansing by the Serbs.

The trial judges found the evidence of

widespread and systematic rape in the Serb camps to be highly credible, citing
evidence that “both male and female prisoners were subjected to severe
mistreatment, [including] beatings, sexual assaults, torture, and executions.”31
The judges acknowledged that female prisoners the Omarska camp were
routinely and savagely raped by prison guards and soldiers, and recognized that
the women and girls in the Serb camps endured terrible pain and suffering as a
result of widespread sexual violence.32

The judicial acknowledgment and

punishment of rape during an armed conflict was historic, and was also a vitally
important precedent for both the ICTY and ICTR in regard to sexual violence
trials.

(b) ICTR- Prosecutor v. Akayesu
Jean Paul Akayesu was the first person to be indicted by the ICTR and the
first ever to be convicted of the crime of genocide.

The indictment against

31

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, supra note 22, at para. 154.

32

Id. at paras. 165 and 175.

9

Akayesu arose from his official responsibility for the Taba commune in Rwanda,
which was the site of massacres, beatings, and sexual assaults of civilians by local
police and militias.33 Akayesu, as the bourgmestre of Taba, had control over the
local police force and the responsibility of maintaining order within the
commune.34

The indictment alleged that Akayesu knew that acts of sexual

violence were being committed, that he was occasionally present at the assaults,35
and that he facilitated and encouraged the commission of sexual offenses.36
Akayesu was therefore charged with genocide, complicity in genocide, and
extermination for acts including sexual violence.37 For his acts or omissions
relating to rape and sexual assaults, Akayesu was charged with rape and
inhumane acts and outrages upon personal dignity. 38
The Trial Chamber’s judgment in Akayesu produced several important
rulings relating to sexual violence. First, the Chamber recognized that sexual
violence was an integral part of the Rwandan genocide,39 and found Akayesu

33

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Amended Indictment, supra note 6, at paras. 3 and 4.

34

Id. at paras. 3 -4.

35

Id. at para. 12A.

36

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Amended Indictment, supra note 6, at para. 12B.

37

Id. at counts 1-3 of indictment.

38

Id. at counts 13-15 of indictment.

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998), at para. 731. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]

39

10

guilty of genocide for crimes including rape and sexual assaults.

40

The judges

found that rapes of Tutsi women and girls had been widespread and systematic,
and that Akayesu had been present at many of the rapes.41

His presence,

attitude, and words were equated to encouragement of sexual violence by the
chamber.42 In finding Akayesu individually criminally responsible for genocide,
the Chamber noted that he had “ordered, instigated, and otherwise aided and
abetted sexual violence.”43
Importantly, the Trial Chamber recognized rape and sexual assaults as
independent crimes. Akayesu was convicted of crimes against humanity for
rape and other inhumane acts,44 and the Chamber noted that sexual violence
could also constitute “serious bodily and mental harm” and “outrages upon
personal dignity” under the ICTR Statute.45 The Chamber suggested that sexual
assault could also be charged as torture, violence to life, health and physical or
mental well-being of persons, or cruel treatment.46 Akayesu was not convicted of
cruel

treatment

or

for

outrages

upon

personal

40

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at para. 734.

41

Id. at para. 460.

42

Id. at para. 708.

43

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at para. 452.

44

Id. (counts 13-14).

45

Id. at para. 692 (under art. 2 and 4).

46

dignity,

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at para. 692 (under art. 2-4).

11

however.

Controversially, the Trial Chamber held that it was not adequately established
that Akayesu belonged to the class of persons who could be held responsible for
serious violations of Article 3.47

In a controversial holding, the Chamber

reasoned that an active support of the war effort was a requirement for a penalty
under Article 3.48
The Akayesu Chamber also noted that rape could constitute torture if
inflicted or ordered by, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity.49

B. Rules of Procedure and Evidence Relating to the Prosecution of Rape
(1) Comparison of ICTY/ ICTR Rules
(a) Rule 96- Evidence in cases of sexual assault
The rules of procedure and evidence for the Tribunals were designed to
give substantial protection to victims of sexual violence, in order to encourage
them to testify.

Under Rule 96 of both the ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure

47

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at paras. 631-35.

48

Id.

49

Id. at para. 597.

12

and Evidence, no corroboration of a rape victim’s testimony is required50 (unlike
many domestic courts, which often abide by the unus testis, nullus testis rule.51)
Both Tribunals forbid defendants from claiming as a defense that a rape
victim consented to sexual intercourse, with some narrow exceptions. Under the
ICTY and ICTR Rules, consent is not allowed as a defense if: (a) the victim was
subjected to, threatened with, or had reason to fear violence, duress, detention or
psychological oppression; or (b) the victim reasonably believed that someone else
might be so subjected or put in fear, if she did not consent.52 In the limited
circumstances where consent might legitimately be used as a defense, the
defendant must first satisfy either the ICTY or ICTR judges in camera that
evidence of consent would be relevant and credible.53
A rape victim’s previous sexual history or conduct is not allowed into
evidence or allowed to be used as a defense under either the ICTY or ICTR

ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 29, at Rule 96; International Criminal
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring
States, Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule
96, U.N. Doc. ____ , amended by U.N. Doc.____ (2003). [hereinafter ICTR Rules of Procedure
and Evidence or ICTR Rules]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]

50

51

i.e., One witness is no witness. Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed.), St. Paul, Minn.: West, 2000.

52

ICTY Rules, supra note 29, Rule 96(ii); and ICTR Rules, supra note 50, Rule 96(ii).

53

Id. at Rule 96(iii).
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Rules.54

(See Section V below for further discussion.)

Rule 96 has been

extremely important in the Tribunals’ prosecution of rape, as victims in
jurisdictions with less protective rules are often too frightened, ashamed, or
embarrassed to testify to their experiences. The provisions of Rule 96 make it
less likely that irrelevant, embarrassing, or prejudicial evidence about rape
victims will be heard in court, or that victims will be harassed during crossexamination.

(b) Other rules that protect rape victims and witnesses
Several rules provide additional protection for victims and witnesses of
sexual violence. Rule 34 provides for a support center for each Tribunal, where
victims and witnesses of sexual assaults can receive protective measures and
psychological counseling.55 The identities of victims and witnesses may be kept
secret while they are thought to be in danger,56 although their names must
generally be revealed to the defense.57 The original Tribunal policy allowing the
total anonymity of witnesses was amended after widespread complaints that

54

ICTY Rules, supra note 29, and ICTR Rules, supra note 50, at Rule 96(iv).

ICTY Rules, supra note 29, Rule 34 (Victims and Witnesses Section); and ICTR Rules, supra note
50, Rule 34 (Victims and Witnesses Support Unit.)

55

56

Id., Rule 69 (Protection of Victims and Witnesses).

Id., Rules 69 (Protection of Victims and Witnesses) and 75 (Measures for the Protection of
Victims and Witnesses).
57

14

defendants’ rights were being abridged.58 Defendants now generally have the
right to know their accuser’s identity in time to make preparations for defense.
The adequacy of witness protection has been a very controversial issue, as many
witnesses have been threatened or killed during the course of the trials. Many
witnesses still live within the territories of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
and fear that they or their families will be harmed as a result of their testimony.59
Judges at the ICTY and ICTR have the discretion to order several types of
protective measures in order to safeguard victims and witnesses.

Written

depositions are increasingly accepted at the ICTY rather than live testimony,
although the ICTR Rules still specify that a written deposition should only
replace live testimony in exceptional circumstances.60 A chamber may order the
excision of a witness’s name from the public record, the replacement of a
witness’s name with a pseudonym, or a closed trial.61 Witnesses may be allowed
to testify through closed-circuit television or video, or with a voice- or image-

See Mercedes Momeni, Balancing the Procedural Rights of the Accused Against a Mandate to Protect
Victims and Witnesses: An Examination of the Anonymity Rules of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 41 How. L.J. 155 (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 11.]

58

59

See id. at 174.

See Patricia M. Wald, To “Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence”: The Use of Affidavit
Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 Harv. Int’l. L.J. 535 (2001).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12]; ICTY Rules, supra note 29, Rule 71
(Depositions); and ICTR Rules, supra note 50, Rule 71 (Depositions).
60

61

Id., Rules 75 (Measures for the Protection of Victims and Witnesses) and 79 (Closed Sessions).
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altering device under both the ICTY and ICTR Rules.62

Trial chambers are

instructed to control questioning so that witnesses are not harassed or
intimidated during their testimony.63

These measures are all designed to

encourage reluctant witnesses to come forward, as witness testimony is often the
only evidence available to prosecutors (especially in cases of rape and sexual
assault.)

C. Major Decisions of the Tribunals
(1) Tribunal Definitions of Rape, Sexual Assault, and Coercion
In Prosecutor v. Furundzija, the ICTY Trial Chamber defined rape as a
forcible act, meaning that the act “is accomplished by force or threats of force
against the victim or a third person, such threats being express or implied and
must place the victim in reasonable fear that he, she or a third person will be
subjected to violence, detention, duress or psychological oppression."64 The act
of rape was defined as “the penetration of the vagina, the anus or mouth by the
penis, or of the vagina or anus by other object. In this context, it includes

ICTY Rules, supra note 29, Rules 71 bis and 75 (Measures for the Protection of Victims and
Witnesses); ICTR Rules, supra note 50, Rule 75 (Measures for the Protection of Victims and
Witnesses).

62

63

Id.

Opinion and Judgment, No. IT-95-17/1-T (Dec. 10, 1998), at para. 174. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 27.]

64
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penetration, however slight, of the vulva, anus or oral cavity, by the penis and
sexual penetration of the vulva or anus is not limited to the penis.”65

The

Furundzija definition was criticized by the Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et
al., which held that it did not adequately address factors that might “render an
act of sexual penetration non-consensual.”66

The Kunarac Chamber held that, in

determining consent to sexual penetration, the test should be whether a victim’s
“sexual autonomy” was violated.67 The autonomy test allowed the Chamber to
consider a wider range of factors that might negate consent than under the
Furundzija definition.
The ICTR Trial Chamber defined rape and sexual violence in broad and
progressive terms in Akayesu. Moving away from traditional definitions, the
Chamber stated that “variations on the act of rape may include acts which
involve the insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily orifices not considered
to be intrinsically sexual.”68 The judges defined rape as a “physical invasion of a
sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive,”
and sexual violence as “any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a

65

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Opinion and Judgment, supra note 64, at para. 174.

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (June 12, 2000), at para. 438
(emphasis in original.) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33.]

66

67

68

Id. at para. 457.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at para. 596.
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person under circumstances which are coercive.”69 Acts of sexual violence could
include “forcible sexual penetration of the vagina, anus or oral cavity by a penis
and/or of the vagina or anus by some other object, and sexual abuse, such as
forced nudity.” The Chamber also held that coercion could include not only
physical force, but also threats, intimidations, and other types of duress.70
The term enslavement was defined broadly by the Kunarac Chamber as
“the exercise of any or all of the powers attached to the right of ownership over a
person,” including such factors as control of movement, threats of force or
coercion, forced labor, and control of sexuality.71 Cruel treatment, according to
the Tadic Trial Chamber, included inhumane acts that caused “injury to a human
being in terms of physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity.”72 Under
this definition, sexual mutilation constituted an inhumane act.73

(2) Comparisons of ICTY/ ICTR rulings on crimes of sexual violence
The Office of the Prosecutor has determined that sexual violence can be
prosecuted either as an independent crime or implicitly as an element of other

69

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at para. 598.

70

Id. at para. 52.

71

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, supra note 66, at para. 450.

72

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, supra note 22, at 729.

73

Id.
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crimes, under all four types of crimes within the ICTY’s jurisdiction (i.e., grave
breaches, violations of the laws or customs of war, crimes against humanity, and
genocide).74

Sexual violence may also be prosecuted explicitly or implicitly

under all three types of crimes within the ICTR’s jurisdiction (i.e., crimes against
humanity, genocide, and violations of the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol II).

a.) Genocide (ICTY Article 4/ ICTR Article 2 )
i.) Genocide
Under the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, genocide consists of acts committed
with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, including: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members to the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part; and (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group.75

Patricia Viseur Sellers and Kaoru Okizumi, Intentional Prosecution of Sexual Assaults, 7
Transnat’l. L. & Contemp. Probs. 45, 57-58 (1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 10.]

74

75

ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 4; ICTR Statute, supra note 10, art. 2.
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If a defendant committed sexual violence during a genocidal campaign,
evidence of sexual offenses may help to establish an element of genocide. For
example, acts of rape and sexual assault may fall under either subsections (b)
(causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a group) or (c)
(deliberately inflicting on a group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part) of the required actus reus.76
The ICTR has obtained four convictions for genocide in which sexual
violence against civilians played a significant role. Akayesu was the first of these
cases, and the first trial ever to find a defendant guilty of genocide based partly
on acts of rape. The Chamber relied heavily on testimony by victims of sexual
violence in finding the defendant guilty of genocide. In regard to sexual assaults
on Tutsi women at the Taba commune, the Chamber held that they constituted
serious bodily or mental harm under the genocide statute, and that Akayesu had
encouraged such crimes through his presence, words, and attitudes.77

As

Akayesu had official control of the area where the acts occurred, the Chamber
found him individually criminally responsible for the serious bodily and mental
harm to the victims of sexual violence.78

76

Sellers (1997), supra note 74, at 57-58.

77

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at para. 504.

78

See discussion of Akayesu, supra at Section II (A) (2).
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The Akayesu Chamber held that the Genocide Convention, upon which the
tribunal’s genocide statute was based, is “undeniably” a part of customary
international law,79 and the ICTY has agreed to this proposition in several cases
well.80 In order to convict a defendant of genocide under the ICTR ruling, a
prosecutor must show that the accused aided, abetted, encouraged, or directly
participated in acts designed to destroy a particular national, ethnic, racial or
religious group.81 Also, the prosecutor must show that the defendant possessed
the specific intent to destroy the group, in whole or in part, at the time the
genocidal acts took place.82

Those requirements were upheld by subsequent

ICTR cases, including Prosecutor v. Musema (where the defendant was also
convicted).83

The ICTY has upheld very similar requirements for genocide, also

echoing the ICTR in holding that a specific intent may be inferred from facts,
circumstances, or “a pattern of purposeful action.”84 These facts can include
incidents of sexual violence against a protected group.

79

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at para. 495.

See e.g., Prosecutor v. Stakic, Judgment, No. IT-97-24-PT (July 31, 2003), at para. 500.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36]; Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Case No. IT-9510, Judgement, 14 December 1999 (“Jelisic Trial Judgement”) para. 60, cited by Prosecutor v. Stakic,
Judgment, No. IT-97-24-PT.
80

81

ICTR Statute, supra at 10, at art. 2.

82

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at para. 498.

83

Prosecutor v. Musema, Judgment and Sentence, No. ICTR-96-13 (January 27, 2000).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28.]

84

Prosecutor v. Stakic, Judgment, supra note 80, at para. 526.

21

ii.) Complicity in genocide
The Akayesu Chamber held that charges of genocide and complicity in
genocide were mutually exclusive for the same act, and that a defendant could
not be found guilty of both for the same acts or omissions.85

However,

according to Prosecutor v. Semanza, there is no material distinction between
complicity in genocide and “the broad definition accorded to aiding and
abetting” in the more serious charge of genocide.86

Semanza was convicted of

complicity in genocide because the Chamber considered him to be a mere
accomplice, rather than a principal perpetrator.87 Semanza was not found guilty
of genocide, as the charge of complicity arose out of the same factual
allegations.88
In Musema, the defendant was convicted of both genocide and complicity
in genocide; the Chamber found the defendant guilty of complicity because he
knowingly and voluntarily aided, abetted, or instigated others to commit
genocide, while knowing that such persons were committing genocide.

89

The

Chamber ruled that the specific intent to destroy a group was not a requirement

85

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at para. 532.

Prosecutor v. Semanza, Judgment, No. ICTR-97-20 (May 15, 2003), at para. 394. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]

86

87

Id. at para. 436.

88

Id.

89

Prosecutor v. Musema, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 83, at para. 887.
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for complicity.90

Since Musema was found to be both the de jure and de facto

superior of employees who committed genocidal acts, and was personally
present at the attack sites, the Chamber found it sufficient that Musema knew or
had reason to know that his subordinates were about to commit genocidal acts or
had done so already.91

The Chamber held Musema accountable for failing to

take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the commission of the
genocidal acts by his subordinates.92

iii.) Conspiracy to commit genocide
The Trial Chamber in Musema held that a defendant could not be
convicted of conspiracy for the same acts or omissions alleged in a complicity
conviction, as the two were mutually exclusive.93

The Chamber defined a

conspiracy to commit genocide as “an agreement between two or more persons
to commit the crime of genocide,” with a mens rea of the specific intent to commit
genocide.94 The Chamber held that an act of conspiracy would theoretically be
punishable even if the substantive offense did not actually occur.95

90

Prosecutor v. Musema, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 83, at para. 887.

91

Id. at para. 894.

92

Id. at para. 894.

93

Prosecutor v. Musema, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 83, at para. 198.

94

Id. at para. 191.

95

Id. at para. 194.
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The Chamber in Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka found the defendant guilty of
genocide for leading and participating in attacks against Tutsi refugees.96 The
Chamber also found Niyitegeka guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide for
attending and speaking at meetings, and for planning, leading, and participating
in attacks against Tutsi civilians.97

iv.) Direct and public incitement to genocide
The Trial Chamber in Akayesu held that a conviction for direct and public
incitement to commit genocide depended on two factors: the place where the
incitement occurred and whether or not assistance was selective or limited.98
According to the Chamber, the required mens rea for incitement would be the
intent to directly prompt or provoke another to commit genocide, and the act of
incitement would be punishable even if it failed to produce the result expected
by the perpetrator.99 Following the guidelines from Akayesu, the Trial Chamber
in Niyitegeka convicted the defendant of direct and public incitement to commit
genocide for public statements he made urging attackers to “work” (a
euphemism for killing Tutsis.)100 The defendant in Prosecutor v. Ruggiu was also

Judgment and Sentence, No. ICTR-96-14 (May 16, 2003), at para. 420. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 29.]
96

97

Id. at para. 429.

98

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at para. 688.

99

Id. at para. 688.
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convicted of direct and public incitement to genocide for making inflammatory
radio broadcasts urging the massacre of Tutsis, and specifically calling for rape
and sexual assaults of Tutsi women.101 Charges of conspiracy and complicity in
genocide against Ruggiu were dismissed after he pled guilty to the charge of
incitement.102
To date, no ICTY defendants have been convicted under Article 4 for
genocidal crimes involving sexual violence, although some scholars believe that
several defendants who were not charged with genocidal crimes could have been
convicted.103

The only ICTY defendants charged with such crimes have either

been acquitted due to insufficient evidence of genocidal intent104 or else the
charges have been withdrawn as part of a plea bargain.105

100

Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 96, at para. 437.

Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Judgment and Sentence, No. ICTR-97-32 (June 1, 2000). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
101

102

Id.

See e.g., Kelly D. Askin, Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan
Tribunals: Current Status, 93 A.J.I.L. 97 (1999). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]
103

See Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavic, Sentencing Judgment, No. IT-00-39 & 40/1 (Feb.27, 2003).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]

104

105

See Prosecutor v. Stakic, Judgment, supra note 80.
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b.) Crimes Against Humanity (ICTY Article 5/ ICTR Article 3)
According to the ICTR, a crime against humanity consists of an act that is:
(1) inhumane in nature and character, causing great suffering, or serious injury
to body or to mental or physical health, (2) committed as part of a wide spread or
systematic attack, (3) committed against members of the civilian population, and
(4) committed on one or more discriminatory grounds, namely, national,
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds (or against persons not falling within
one of these groups, if the perpetrator's intention was to further his attacks on the
group discriminated against on one of the grounds mentioned in Article 3 of the
Statute.)106 The ICTY requirements are more or less identical; in Stakic, five
separate elements were specified: (1) There must be an attack; (2) The acts of
the perpetrator must be part of that attack; (3) The attack must be directed
against any civilian population;

(4)

The attack must be widespread or

systematic; and (5) The perpetrator must know that his acts constitute part of a
pattern of widespread or systematic crimes directed against a civilian population
and know that his acts fit into such a pattern.107 Additionally, for a conviction by
the ICTY, an attack must take place during an armed conflict, and there must be
a nexus between the armed conflict and the attack.108

106

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at paras. 578 and 583-84.

107

Prosecutor v. Stakic, Judgment, supra note 80, at para. 621.

108

Id. at para. 626.
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Rape is specifically listed as a crime against humanity in both the
Yugoslav and Rwandan Statutes under subsection (g), but can also be charged
implicitly under other provisions.109

i.) Extermination as a Crime against Humanity
Four ICTR defendants (Akayesu, Musema, Niyitegeka, and Semanza) and
one ICTY defendant (Stakic) have been convicted of extermination where sexual
violence was a component of the crimes. According to Akayesu, extermination is
a crime directed against a group of individuals, which requires an element of
mass destruction.110

In order for a defendant to be convicted of extermination,

Akayesu held the prosecution must show that: (1) the accused or his subordinate
participated in the killing of certain civilians, (2) the act or omission was
unlawful and intentional,

(3) the unlawful act or omission was part of a

widespread or systematic attack, and (4) the attack was based on discriminatory
grounds (namely: national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.)111 The
widespread rapes and assaults of Tutsi women were considered to be a part of
the “mass destruction” of a population needed for extermination.
The ICTY Trial Chamber espoused similar requirements in Stakic, adding
that the mens rea required for extermination was the intent to kill persons on a
109

Sellers (1997), supra note 74, at 57-58.

110

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at paras. 591-92.

111

Id.
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massive scale or to create conditions of life that lead to the death of large
numbers of individuals.112

Stakic was found guilty of extermination for a

“campaign of annihilation of non-Serbs,” which included sexual violence against
civilians by Serb police and military forces.113

ii.) Enslavement as a Crime against Humanity
Kunarac and Kovac, two ICTY defendants, were found guilty of
enslavement in connection with their confinement of several women in an
abandoned house.114 The Chamber found that the women were regularly raped
by the soldiers over a period of several months and that the defendants had total
control over them.115 Since the statute did not explicitly define enslavement, the
Kunarac Trial Chamber explored customary international law and defined the
crime as “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership over a person.”116 The Chamber found Kunarac and Kovac guilty of
enslavement for exercising rights of ownership over the women, including the

112

Prosecutor v. Stakic, Judgment, supra note 80, at para. 653.

113

Id. at para. 655.

114

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Judgment, supra note 66, at para. 742.

115

Id.

116

Id. at para. 539.
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restriction of movement, sexual exploitation, sale of sexual services, and forced
domestic labor.117

iii.) Torture as a Crime against Humanity
Two ICTY defendants, Kunarac and Vukovic, were convicted of torture in
connection with sexual assaults at the Partizan sports hall where women were
imprisoned and repeatedly raped.118

The Kunarac Trial Chamber held that

torture was a violation of conventional and customary international law, as well
as a violation of the natural law of jus cogens.119 According to the Chamber, the
elements of torture included: (1) The infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, (2) an intent to inflict such pain and
suffering, and (3) the purpose of either obtaining information or a confession;
punishing, intimidating or coercing a victim; or discriminating, on any ground,
against a victim.120

The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Furundzija additionally

held that humiliating the victim or a third person constituted a prohibited
purpose for torture under international humanitarian law,121 and the Celebici
Trial Chamber stated that the prohibited purposes listed in the Torture
117

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Judgment, supra note 66, at para. 742.

118

Id. at para. 883.

119

Id. at para. 466.

120

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Judgment, supra note 66, at para. 497.

121

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Opinion and Judgment, supra note 64, at para. 162.
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Convention as reflected by customary international law “do not constitute an
exhaustive list, and should be regarded as merely representative.”122
Kunarac held that the presence of a state official or person in authority was
not necessary in order for acts to constitute torture under international
humanitarian law, in contrast to earlier ICTY and ICTR decisions.123

The

Chamber reasoned that the state actor requirement was inconsistent with the
application of individual criminal responsibility for international crimes.124 It is
therefore possible for regular soldiers and civilians to be convicted of torture, if
the other requirements are met.
The Kunarac Chamber ruled that rape can constitute torture because it
caused victims severe mental and physical pain and suffering, and added that
“rape is one of the worst sufferings a human being can inflict upon another.”125
Regarding mental suffering, the Furundzija Trial Chamber ruled that being forced
to watch serious sexual attacks inflicted on a female acquaintance also
constituted torture for the forced observer.126 Because the defendants in Kunarac
acted intentionally and with the aim of discriminating against the Muslims

Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al. (“Celebici”), Opinion and Judgment, No. IT-96-21 (November 16,
1998), at para. 470. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 26.]
122

123

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Judgment, supra note 66, at para. 496.

124

Id.

125

Id. at para. 655.

126

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Opinion and Judgment, supra note 64, at para. 162.
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detained at the sports hall (in particular women and girls), they were found to
have the requisite mens rea for a torture conviction for their acts of rape.127 The
Chamber held that it did not matter if discriminatory intent formed only part of
the motivation for a sexual attack, as long as it was a substantial part.128
The ICTR stated in Akayesu that:

Like torture rape is used for such purposes as intimidation,
degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment control or
destruction of a person. Like torture rape is a violation of personal
dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity.129

Two ICTR defendants, Serushago and Semanza, were convicted of torture for the
rapes of several Tutsi women during outbreaks of genocidal violence.

The

Semanza Chamber defined torture as the intentional infliction of severe physical
or mental pain or suffering for prohibited purposes (the same three purposes
outlined in Kunarac,) and found the defendant guilty for encouraged a crowd to
rape Tutsi women before killing them.130 Defendant Serushago pled guilty to a
count of torture relating to sexual violence at the Commune Rouge.131

127

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Judgment, supra note 66, at para. 654.

128

Id.

129

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at para. 597.

130

Prosecutor v. Semanza, Judgment, supra note 86, at paras. 343 and 481.

Prosecutor v. Serushago, Judgment and Sentence, No. ICTR-98-39 (Feb. 5, 1999). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 30.]
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iv.) Rape as a Crime against Humanity
Seven charges of rape as a crime against humanity have been successfully
prosecuted at the ICTY (against defendants Cesic, Kunarac, Kovic, Nikolic, and
Vukovic).

Many ICTY and ICTR Trial Chambers have accepted the broad

definition of rape provided in Akayesu.132 Three ICTR defendants have been
convicted of rape (Akayesu, Musema, and Semanza).
have either been withdrawn or defendants acquitted.

Seven charges of rape
In many cases, rape

victims have decided not to testify, or charges have been dropped as part of a
plea bargain.
The success of the charge of rape depends very heavily on the availability
of victim testimony and any additional evidence. In some cases, judges have
held that evidence was insufficient to convict a defendant of an individual act of
rape, even when the judges acknowledged that widespread or systematic rapes
were being committed in the same location or even by the same individuals.133
The fairness of these acquittals has been widely criticized by victims’ advocates,
given the context of mass rape in the Yugoslav and Rwandan conflicts.
Arguably, the standards of evidence should be somewhat relaxed, since women
were often raped repeatedly by multiple attackers, and should not be reasonably
expected to remember precise details of each incident. However, others believe
See supra note 69. (“A physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive.”)

132

133

See e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Judgment, supra note 66 (rape of Witness FWS-48.)
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that proving individual cases of rape beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary for
a fair trial.

v.) Persecution as a Crime against Humanity
According to the ICTY, persecution involves an act or omission that: (1)
discriminates in fact and denies or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down
in customary international or treaty law (the actus reus); and (2) is carried out
deliberately with the intent to discriminate on political, racial and religious
grounds (mens rea).134
Persecution has been the most successfully prosecuted crime against
humanity involving sexual violence, due to the fact that seven defendants have
pled guilty as part of a plea bargain, in exchange for the withdrawal of other
charges.135

Six more ICTY defendants have been convicted of persecution

(Kvocka, Prcac, Kos, Radic, and Zigic), for acts including sexual violence in the
Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje detention camps.136

Rape, sexual assault,

harassment, humiliation, and psychological abuse have been considered as acts
of persecution in several ICTY cases. Only two ICTR defendants have been
charged with persecution involving sexual violence (Ruggiu and Semanza),
134

Prosecutor v. Stakic, Judgment, supra note 80, at para. 732.

135

Defendants Dosen, Kolundzija, Plavsic, Nikolic, Ruggiu, Sikirica, and Todorovic.

Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Judgment, No. IT-98-30/1 (Nov. 2, 2001). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 38.]
136
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probably due to the fact that ICTR defendants have been more likely to be
charged with crimes of genocide, which carry heavier penalties.

vi.) Other Inhumane Acts
Two ICTY defendants have been convicted of “other inhumane acts” for
such acts as forcing two male prisoners to perform sex acts and then sexually
mutilate another male prisoner (Tadic),137 and for allowing soldiers and other
men to rape female detainees at the Susica camp (Nikolic).138 The Tadic Chamber
looked for guidance to the International Law Commission Draft Statute for a
Permanent International Criminal Court, which noted that "the notion of other
inhumane acts is circumscribed by two requirements. First, this category of acts
is intended to include only additional acts that are similar in gravity to those
listed in the preceding subparagraphs [e.g., torture, rape].

Secondly, the act

must in fact cause injury to a human being in terms of physical or mental
integrity, health or human dignity.”139 The Chamber held that sexual mutilation
of the prisoner fell within these two requirements.140

Two ICTR defendants
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have also been convicted of “other inhumane acts” involving responsibility for
rapes and sexual assaults of Tutsi women and girls (Akayesu and Niyitegeka).141

c.) Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (ICTY Article 2)
A grave breach of the Geneva Convention requires: (1) an international
conflict, and (2) a grave breach perpetrated against persons or property defined
as "protected" by any of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Article 4(1) of
Geneva Convention IV (protection of civilians) defines "protected persons" as
those "in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they
are not nationals."142 Rape and sexual assault can constitute grave breaches
under subsections (b) (torture or inhumane treatment) and (c) (willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to bodily health) of the ICTY Statute.143
The ICTY has obtained six convictions for grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions for acts of sexual violence and torture. Tadic was charged under
subsections (b) and (c) for ordering the sexual abuse and mutilation of male
prisoners, but the Trial Chamber initially found him not guilty because it did not
classify the victims as protected persons under the Conventions.144

However,

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39; Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Judgment and
Sentence, supra note 96.
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the Appeals Chamber held that the victims were protected persons, and found
Tadic guilty of torture and inhumane treatment and also of willfully causing
great suffering.
The majority of the Tadic Appeals Chamber found that grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions could only be committed in international armed
conflicts, and that the requirement was an integral part of Article 2.145 However,
Judge Abi-Saab stated in his Separate Opinion that a strong case could be made
for the application of Article 2 to an internal conflict.146 The majority recognized
that customary international law might be changing to accept the broadening of
scope of the Geneva Conventions to include internal conflicts, and the Celebici
Trial Chamber stated that this possible change in customary international law
should be recognized.147
In Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., the defendant Delic was convicted of two
counts of torture or inhumane treatment for the rapes of two women in the
Celebici prison camp.148 Delic and another defendant, Delalic, were found not
guilty for two acts of sexual violence at the camp: in the first incident, brothers
in the camp were forced to perform sex acts on each other, and in the second, a

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Judgment, supra note 25; cited by Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al.
(“Celebici”), Opinion and Judgment, supra note 122, at Sect. VI (Judgment).
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prisoner was given electric shocks on his genitals.149 Their co-defendant, Mucic,
however, was convicted of torture or inhumane treatment for the first of the acts,
and of willfully causing great suffering for the second.150

The Trial Chamber

held that forcing the relatives to commit sexual acts was a fundamental attack on
their human dignity, and that the act constituted inhuman treatment under
Article 2 of the Statute.151 The Trial Chamber noted that the act could have also
constituted rape, if it had been charged by the Office of the Prosecutor.152

D.) Violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II (ICTR Art. 4)

Sexual violence can theoretically constitute a serious violation of Common
Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, under subsections (a) (violence to life,
health, and physical or mental well-being) and (e) (outrages upon personal
dignity.)

However, although eight such violations of Common Article 3 and

Additional Protocol II have been alleged in ICTR indictments, no defendant has
yet been convicted under this portion of the Statute for crimes of sexual violence.
Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al. (“Celebici”), Opinion and Judgment, supra note 122, Sect. VI
(Judgment).
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Three defendants (Musema, Niyitegeka, and Semanza) have been acquitted of
the charge of violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being for sexual
offenses against civilians.

Likewise, none of the four charges of outrages upon

personal dignity have led to convictions in Akayesu, Musema, Niyitegeka, or
Semanza.
The Akayesu Trial Chamber held that the norms of Common Article 3
have acquired the status of customary international law, a view also shared by
the ICTY Trial Chambers and Appeals Chamber.153

In regard to Additional

Protocol II (dealing with non-international conflict), the Akayesu Chamber stated
that the fundamental guarantees formed part of existing customary international
law.154

In order for an offense to be covered by this section of the ICTR Statute,

the requirements for both Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II must be
met.155
In cases involving sexual violence charged under ICTR Article 4, the
Prosecution has had the difficult burden of showing that: (1) an armed conflict
took place in Rwanda between its armed forces and dissenting armed forces or
other organized armed groups; and (2) that the dissident armed forces or other
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organized armed groups were: (a) under responsible command,

(b) able to

exercise such control over a part of their territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations, and (c) able to implement
Additional Protocol II.156
The Prosecutor also has the burden of proving a nexus between a
defendant’s act and a broader armed conflict, and, if necessary, that the alleged
perpetrator and victim belonged to certain classes.157 Under Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions, the perpetrator must belong to a "party to the
conflict," whereas under Additional Protocol II, the perpetrator must be a
member of the "armed forces" of either the government or the dissidents.158 The
Akayesu Trial Chamber held that the perpetrator class should include
individuals who were legitimate public officials, agents, or persons with de facto
authority representing the Government to support or fulfill the war efforts.159
The ICTR Appeals Chamber disagreed and expanded the applicability of Article
4, stating that criminal responsibility did not depend on any particular
classification of the alleged perpetrator.160 In Musema, the Trial Chamber upheld
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this view and found that Article 4 could be applied to civilians.161 The Musema
Trial Chamber also defined the class of possible victims negatively, as any
persons outside the class of perpetrators.162

The Semanza Trial Chamber held

that the class of victims could include “any individual[s] not taking part in the
hostilities,” guided by an identical ICTY Trial Chamber ruling in the Celebici
case.163
The Musema Chamber found the defendant not guilty of violations of
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, because the Prosecutor had failed
to show that there had been a nexus between the alleged offense and the armed
conflict.164 The Trial Chamber in Semanza agreed with the ICTY’s observation in
Kunarac that a nexus existed between an alleged offence and a non-international
armed conflict when the alleged offence was closely related to the hostilities.165
In determining whether the requisite close relation existed, the Chamber quoted
Kunarac:
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[T]he existence of armed conflict must, at a minimum, have
played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit [the
offence], his decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed
or the purpose for which it was committed. Hence, if it can be established
… that the perpetrator acted in furtherance of or under the guise of the
armed conflict, it would be sufficient to conclude that his acts were
closely related to the armed conflict.166

The ICTR Chamber acknowledged a nexus between the armed conflict
and Semanza’s acts, but found him not guilty of rape and sexual assaults as
violations of Article 4 due to insufficient evidence.167

E.) Violations of the Laws or Customs of War (ICTY Article 3)
The Appeals Chamber for the Delalic case held that the defendants could
be convicted under either Article 3 or Article 5 for the same incidents of rape and
torture, since each Article had at least one materially distinct element that did not
appear in the other.168

This view was shared by ICTY Trial Chambers in

subsequent cases.

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Judgment, supra note 66; quoted in Prosecutor v. Semanza, Judgment,
supra note 86, at para. 517
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Sexual violence may be prosecuted implicitly as a violation of the laws or
customs of war as either: (1) violations of the Hague law; (2) infringements of
provisions of the Geneva Conventions other than those classified as "grave
breaches" by those conventions; (3) violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and other customary rules on internal conflicts; or (4) violations of
agreements binding upon the parties to the conflict, considered qua treaty law,
(i.e., agreements which have not turned into customary law).169

Common

Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions proscribes a number of acts committed
within an armed conflict (including rape, torture, and outrages upon personal
dignity), if the acts have a close connection to the armed conflict and are
committed against persons who take no active part in hostilities.170
In order to fulfill the requirements of Article 3, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber has held that: (1) a violation must constitute an infringement of a rule
of international humanitarian law; (2) the rule must be customary in nature or, if
it belongs to treaty law, the required conditions must be met; (3) the violation
must be "serious", i.e., it must constitute a breach of a rule protecting important
values, and the breach must involve grave consequences for the victim; and (4)
the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the
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individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.171 Also, there
must be a close nexus between an individual violation and a broader armed
conflict, and the violation must be committed against persons taking no active
part in the hostilities.172

Under the provisions of Article 3, ICTY defendants

have been charged variously with: (a) cruel treatment, (b) rape, (c) torture, (c)
outrages upon personal dignity, (d) unlawfully inflicting terror upon civilians,
and (e) humiliating or degrading treatment, for acts of sexual violence committed
during the armed conflict in Yugoslavia.
Three charges of cruel treatment as a violation of the laws or customs of
war have been successfully prosecuted in the ICTY for sexual offenses. In Tadic,
the defendant was convicted of cruel treatment in connection with the abuse and
genital mutilation of a male prisoner, but an identical charge for an act of rape
was withdrawn after the witness refused to testify.173 The ICTY Chamber held
that cruel treatment included “violence to the life, health and physical or mental
well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as
torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment."174
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was also found guilty of cruel treatment for torturing prisoners and forcing them
to commit sexual acts at the Celebici detention camp.175
Rape is expressly prohibited under the Fourth Geneva Convention and
Additional Protocol II.

ICTY Trial Chambers have held that rape is a violation

of the laws and customs of war under customary international law, and six
counts of rape have been successfully prosecuted under Article 3.

Defendant

Kunarac was convicted of four counts of rape under Article 3, and his codefendants Kovac and Vukovic of one count each, for attacks on women in the
municipality of Foca. The Kunarac Trial Chamber held that there was “no doubt”
that rape constituted a serious violation of common Article 3.176

(Kunarac and

his co-defendant, Vukovic, were also acquitted of one count each of rape due to
inconsistencies in the alleged victim’s testimony and her inability to remember
exact details of the incidents).177
Seven ICTY defendants have been convicted of torture under Article 3 in
connection with sexual assaults. Torture is prohibited by both conventional and
customary international law, in both internal and international armed
conflicts.178 Rape and sexual assault have been held to constitute torture under
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Article 3 in several ICTY decisions such as Delalic, in which the defendant Delic
was convicted of two counts of torture for raping two female detainees in the
Celebici camp.

The Delalic Chamber held that rape could constitute torture

under Article 3, if the act: (1) caused severe pain or suffering, whether mental or
physical; (2) was inflicted intentionally; (3) was intended to obtain information
or a confession from the victim, or to punish, intimidate, or coerce the victim or a
third person, or was based on discrimination of any kind; and

(4) was

committed by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, an
official or other person acting in an official capacity.179 The Chamber added that
rape struck “at the very core of human dignity and physical integrity,” and
undoubtedly caused severe physical and psychological suffering to victims.180
The Furundzija Trial Chamber also held that rape constituted torture under
certain circumstances, and additionally held that the humiliation of the victim
was a prohibited purpose.181
According to the Delalic Trial Chamber, all of the rape victims were
"persons protected” by the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. The chamber
held that the women were in the hands of a party to the conflict of which they
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were not nationals, as they were Bosnian Serbs detained during an international
armed conflict by a party to that conflict, the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Two defendants have been convicted of sexual offenses constituting
outrages upon personal dignity, including rape in Furundzija and sexual
exploitation and humiliation in Kunarac. The Trial Chamber in Kunarac noted
that the charge was broader than that of inhuman treatment under Common
Article 3, and defined an outrage upon personal dignity as any intentional act
that would generally be considered seriously humiliating, degrading, or
otherwise a serious attack on human dignity.182 The Chamber also held that the
accused must have had knowledge that the act could cause such an effect on the
victim.183
Article 3 has also encompassed one count of humiliating or degrading
treatment at the ICTY. Defendant Cesic pled guilty to this offense for forcing
two brothers at the Luka detention camp to beat each other and perform sexual
acts on each other in the presence of others, causing them great humiliation and
degradation.184
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(3) Controversial issues in sexual violence trials
a. Gender as a protected class
Female victims of sexual violence during the Yugoslav and Rwandan
Conflicts were attacked not only because of their religious and ethnic
backgrounds, but also because of their gender.

Although some men in the

conflicts were sexually abused, women and girls were disproportionately
targeted for rapes and assaults. Many scholars maintain that gender should be
added to the classes protected from persecution, given the fact that rape is such a
frequent and widespread occurrence during armed conflicts.185

The thousands

of rapes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda reflected not only a
desire to persecute people of another ethnicity or religion, but also a desire to
humiliate and terrorize women specifically because of their gender.

The view

that gender should be added to the list of classes protected from persecution is
supported by the Delalic case

(in which the Trial Chamber recognized that

gender formed a basis of discrimination for the offense of torture.)186

b. The requirement of official participation in torture
The earlier Tribunal cases such as Delalic required that an official be
present during an act of rape, or that an official participate in or instigate the act,
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in order for the assault to constitute torture.

After Kunarac and Akayesu,

however, the requirement seems to be losing favor. These newer cases suggest
that any person, including civilians and low-ranking officers, can be prosecuted
for rape as an act of torture if other requirements are met.

c. Forced pregnancy as a tool of ethnic cleansing
The Akayesu Chamber noted that, under Article 2 of the ICTR Statute,
measures intended to prevent births within the group would include such acts as
sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control, separation of
the sexes and prohibition of marriages.187 The Chamber also included deliberate
impregnation in this list, if committed against a member of a patriarchal society
where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the father.188 In
such a case, a woman of a particular group might be raped in order to
deliberately impregnate her with a child who would consequently not belong to
its mother's group. Since thousands of women in Yugoslavia and Rwanda were
raped for this very purpose, it is extremely important that forced impregnation
should be clearly recognized in the Tribunal statutes and reflected in indictments
for rape and sexual violence.
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d. Dismissal of individual rape cases for lack of evidence
Many charges of rape have been dismissed, or defendants acquitted,
because the Tribunal chambers found the evidence of individual acts of rape
insufficient.

Advocates for rape victims have complained that it makes little

sense for judges to acknowledge that mass rapes occurred during the Yugoslav
and Rwandan violence, and even to acknowledge that Serb camps existed for the
purpose of systematic rape, and yet to dismiss individual cases where a victim
has testified that a defendant raped her. As mentioned above, the standards of
evidence should be relaxed somewhat in favor of victims in situations where
rape was endemic in an area, and where thousands of rapes were perpetrated in
order to terrorize an entire group.

III. Superior Responsibility and Individual Criminal Responsibility for Sexual
Violence

A. ICTY/ ICTR rulings on superior responsibility for sexual violence
The foremost precedent for superior responsibility for sexual violence was
the conviction of General Tomoyuki Yamashita at the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East.189 Yamashita was held responsible for war crimes,
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including rapes and sexual assaults, committed against Filipino civilians by
soldiers under his command.190

This case was the first to hold a military

commander accountable for his failure to prevent or punish sexual crimes that he
knew (or should have known) about. However, the Tokyo Tribunal included
rape only among other charges, and did not focus on prosecuting crimes of
sexual violence.
Superior responsibility was incorporated into the statutes of the Yugoslav
and Rwandan Tribunals, and several Tribunal defendants have been charged
with responsibility for rape and sexual violence committed by subordinates.
Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute states that a superior may be held responsible for
his subordinates’ criminal acts under Articles 2 through 5, if he (1) knew or had
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done
so, and (2) if he failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
such acts or to punish the perpetrators. Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute contains
nearly identical language, and applies to Articles 2 through 4 of the ICTR Statute.
The first ICTY case to rule on the superior responsibility of a military
commander for crimes of sexual violence was Delalic. The defendant Delalic was
charged with superior responsibility for crimes at the Celebici prison camp
including rape and torture, but the Trial Chamber found insufficient evidence
that the defendant actually held the alleged position of superior authority at the
190
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camp.191

However, the Chamber held that command responsibility was a norm

of both customary and conventional international law, and that command
responsibility existed where: (1) there was a superior-subordinate relationship;
(2) the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be
or had been committed; and (3) the superior failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator
thereof.192
Delalic did not hold all superiors strictly liable for the acts of their
subordinates, but concluded that a superior possessed the necessary mens rea if:
(1) he had actual knowledge, either through direct or circumstantial evidence,
that his subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes, or (2) he
possessed information that should have put him on notice of the risk of such
offences.193 If a superior did have such information, the Chamber held he had a
duty to investigate whether such crimes were committed or were about to be
committed by his subordinates.194
The ICTR has enumerated very similar requirements for a military
superior’s criminal responsibility.

The Musema Trial Chamber, for example,

held that the Prosecutor must show that: (1) the superior’s subordinate
191
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committed a criminal act; (2) the superior knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate was about to commit such an act, or had committed it; and (3) the
superior failed to take necessary and reasonable steps to prevent the act or to
punish the subordinate.195 The Musema Chamber also found that a superior’s
participation could consist of planning or instigating crimes, ordering that
crimes be committed, or aiding and abetting a subordinate in the commission of
criminal acts.196

Musema was held individually criminally responsible for

sexual crimes committed by his subordinates, since the Trial Chamber found that
he had both de jure and de facto power over his civilian subordinates, and also
that he had abetted in the commission of the acts by his presence and personal
participation.197
In regard to non-military superiors, both the ICTY and ICTR have held
that a civilian can only be convicted for superior responsibility if he had effective
control (either de jure or de facto) over the subordinates committing the criminal
acts.

The Delalic Chamber was the first Tribunal case to extend command

responsibility to individuals in non-military positions of superior authority,198
and this view was adopted in subsequent cases at both the ICTY and ICTR.199
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According to the ICTY Appeals Chamber, a superior with effective control over
subordinates would be responsible for the commission of the crimes if he failed
to exercise his abilities of control, to the extent that he could either prevent his
subordinates from committing crimes or punish them afterwards.200

The

responsibility of civilian superiors with effective control has been upheld in the
most recent Tribunals cases, such as Stakic.201
Defendants may be charged with criminal responsibility for the same
crimes under both subsections (1) and (3) of the Statutes on individual criminal
responsibility.202

The defendants in Kvocka, for example, were charged under

ICTY Article 7(1) for participating in sexual violence, and alternatively or
additionally under Article 7(3) for superior responsibility.

B. ICTY/ ICTR rulings on individual responsibility for sexual violence
Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute states that a person who plans, instigates,
orders, commits or otherwise aides and abets in the planning, preparation or
execution of a crime covered by Articles 2 through 5 shall be individually
responsible for the crime. Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute holds individuals
responsible under the same criteria for crimes under Articles 2 through 4.
200
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The ICTY stated in Furundzija that defendants could be held individually
criminally responsible for planning, ordering, instigating, or aiding and abetting
rape and sexual assault, as well as for the actual commission of the acts.203
According to the Delalic Trial Chamber, individual criminal responsibility for
sexual violence required that an individual’s participation directly and
substantially affected the commission of a sexual crime (the actus reus), and that
the individual participated with the knowledge that he was assisting the
principal offender in the commission of the crime (the mens rea).204

Hence, a

defendant must have had "awareness of the act of participation coupled with a
conscious decision to participate by planning, instigating, ordering, committing,
or otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime."205

The ICTR

similarly held in Semanza that, in order to satisfy ICTR Article 6(1), an
individual’s participation in a crime must have substantially contributed to, or
had a substantial effect on, the completion of the act.206 In order for defendants
to be held individually criminally responsible for acts of sexual violence, they
must have committed a specified actus reus and must have also possessed the
requisite intent.
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In the jurisprudence of the Tribunals, “committing” a crime can mean
either physically perpetrating a crime or engendering a crime by omission.207
The Appeals Chamber in Tadic found that Article 7(1) “covers first and foremost
the physical perpetration of a crime by the offender himself, or the culpable
omission of an act that was mandated by a rule of criminal law.”208 The actus
reus required for committing a crime is that the accused directly participated
(either individually or jointly) in the material elements of a crime, either through
positive acts or omissions.209
The actus reus required for “instigation” is any conduct that prompts
another person to commit a crime, including such behavior as urging,
encouraging, or prompting.210

The required mens rea is that the defendant

intended to provoke or induce the commission of a crime, or was aware of the
substantial likelihood that the commission of a crime would results from his
acts.211

The Akayesu Chamber additionally held that instigation need not be
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direct and public, and that proof was required of a causal connection between
instigation by the defendant and the commission of the crime.212
“Aiding and abetting” is a form of accomplice liability, and the actus reus
consists of providing practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support that
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.213 The mens rea required
is the knowledge that these acts assist or facilitate the commission of the
offence.214

The Delalic Trial Chamber determined that aiding and abetting

included all acts of assistance lending encouragement or support, including
physical acts and psychological support through words or physical presence.215
The Akayesu Trial Chamber Judgment stated that aiding and abetting were
distinct offenses; aiding was defined as giving assistance, while abetting
involved facilitating the commission of an act by being sympathetic.216
According to Kunarac, a defendant’s presence at the scene of a crime was not
conclusive of aiding or abetting, unless the presence significantly legitimized or
encouraged the principal.217
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Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Judgment, supra note 136, at paras. 478-482.
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Id. at para. 253.
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Id.
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Prosecutor v. Delalic, Opinion and Judgment, supra note 122, at para. 327.
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Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at para. 484.
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Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, supra note 66, at para. 393.
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“Ordering” refers to a situation where an individual in a position of
authority uses that authority to order and compel another individual, who is
subject to that authority, to commit a crime.218

Criminal responsibility for

ordering the commission of an act implies that a superior-subordinate
relationship existed between the individual who gave the order and the one who
carried it out.219
The notion of joint criminal enterprise has been espoused in cases where a
defendant was charged with individual criminal responsibility as a coperpetrator of an offense.

The Tadic Appeals Chamber found joint criminal

enterprise liability to be implicit within Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute,
observing that the commission of a crime might also occur through participation
in “the realisation of a common design or purpose.”220

According to the

Chamber, a joint criminal enterprise required that a plurality of persons have a
common plan to commit a crime, and a defendant who participated in the
execution of the plan would be criminally responsible.221

The ICTY Trial

218

Prosecutor v. Semanza, Judgment, supra note 86, at para. 382.

219

Id.

220

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 25, at paras. 185-229.

221

Id. at para. 227.
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Chamber in Kvocka recently upheld the existence of joint criminal enterprise
liability under Article 7(1).222

IV. Evidential Procedures for Minors
Children were often the victims of sexual violence in both the Yugoslav
and Rwandan conflicts,223 but there are very few provisions in the ICTY and
ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence that relate specifically to the testimony of
minors at the Tribunals. Because there is little paper documentation of the ethnic
cleansing and genocide that happened in those conflicts, the testimony of
witnesses has been the primary source of evidence for the Tribunals.

The

testimony of minors is essential if any sexual assailants of children are to be
punished, but special care must be taken with child witnesses to prepare them to
give evidence in a potentially frightening and overwhelming environment.
The protections that are generally afforded to victims and witnesses under
the ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence apply to minors, such as
the counseling services offered by the victims and witnesses support units. (See
Section II (B), supra.) Rule 90 (Testimony of Witnesses) exempts children from
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Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Judgment, supra note 136, at para. 246

See e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 39, at paras. 416-417 (testimony of Witness
J. that girls as young as six were raped by Hutu soldiers); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and
Judgment, supra note 22, at para. 175 (testimony of a doctor at the Trnopolje camp that girls as
young as twelve were raped by Serb soldiers).
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making the usual solemn declaration224 before giving evidence, if the chamber
believes that they are too young to understand the nature of the declaration.225
The Rule states that, in circumstances where a minor has not made the
declaration, a judgment cannot be made solely on the basis of the minor’s
testimony.226

These provisions aside, the testimony of minors raises several

procedural and evidentiary issues not dealt with explicitly in the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence.

A. Hearsay Rule and Possible Exceptions for Minors
The admission of hearsay evidence is especially important when children
are testifying to crimes of sexual violence. Children who were sexually assaulted
during the Yugoslav and Rwanda conflicts may have later been medically
examined or interviewed. The hearsay evidence that a doctor, aid worker, or
interviewer might provide could be extremely important in supporting a child’s
claim of sexual assault.

224 ICTY Rules, supra note 29, and ICTR Rules, supra note 50, Rule 90 (B): “I solemnly declare that I
will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.”
225

ICTY Rules, supra note 29, and ICTR Rules, supra note 50, Rule 90(C).

226

Id.
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Hearsay evidence227 is ordinarily inadmissible in many domestic courts,
especially in common law jurisdictions. However, according to Judge Richard
May, the International Criminal Tribunals have “adopted a liberal approach” to
matters of evidence, “not fettered by common law rules.”228 Under Rule 89(C),
the ICTY and ICTR chambers are granted a great deal of leeway to admit hearsay
evidence (possibly because judges are the triers of fact, and therefore less likely
to be prejudiced by probative evidence than a jury).

In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the

Trial Chamber ruled that hearsay evidence could be admitted as long as it was
relevant, probative, and thought to be reliable.229

The chamber stated that:

In [determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence], the Trial
Chamber will hear both the circumstances under which the evidence
arose as well as the context of the statement. The Trial Chamber may be
guided by, but not bound to, hearsay exceptions generally recognized by
some national legal systems, as well as the truthfulness, voluntariness,
and trustworthiness of the evidence, as appropriate. In bench trial before
the international tribunal, this is the most efficient and fair method to
determine the admissibility of out-of-court statements.230
Hearsay evidence was defined by the ICTY as the “statement of a person made otherwise than
in the proceedings in which it is being tendered, but nevertheless being tendered in those
proceedings in order to establish the truth of what the person says.” Prosecutor v. Aleksovski,
Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, No. IT95-95-14/1-AR73 (Feb. 16,
1999), para. 25; quoted in Gideon Boas, Creating Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law:
The ICTY and the Principle of Flexibility, 12 Crim. L.F. 41, 50 (2001). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]
227

R. May and M. Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague,
and Arusha, 37 Columbia J. Transnat’l. L. 727, 745 (1999); quoted in Gideon Boas, supra note 227, at
47.
228

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on Hearsay, No. IT-94-1 (Aug. 7, 1996), at
para. 7; quoted in Gideon Boas, supra note 227, at 51.
229

230

Id. at 55-56.
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The admission of hearsay evidence was upheld in several subsequent
ICTY cases, and has arguably helped to shorten the length of trials and to
expedite the backlog of cases at the Tribunal.231

Hearsay evidence should be

admitted in relation to a child’s testimony, in accordance with the same rules, if
the evidence is probative, relevant, and believed to be credible.

B. Guidelines for Interviewing Minors and Preparing them for Trial 232
Interviews with minors must be handled sensitively and ageappropriately, considering a child’s feelings as well as their maturity and
understanding of the legal process.

This is especially true where a child has

suffered a physical or emotional trauma like rape or sexual abuse.
An investigator should begin by considering the possible admissibility of
any statements that the child makes to doctors, aid workers, or other adults. The
investigator should endeavor to speak with any person who has examined or
interviewed the child.

If it is possible to speak with a doctor before a child is

examined, the interviewer should make sure that the doctor does not ask any
leading questions, and that she takes careful notes, paying attention to the words

231

See Boas, supra note 227, at 57.

Unless indicated, guidelines are from Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army, The Art of
Trial Advocacy: Preparing the Young Child-Victim for Trial, 2002 Army Law. 42 (2002).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]
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that the child uses. The investigator should also obtain statements made by any
other witnesses in the case.
In order for the investigator’s interview with the child to be admitted into
evidence, it must seem reliable to judges. This requires advance planning and
preparation by the interviewer, especially if the interviewer is not experienced in
dealing with children.

The interview should be videotaped if possible, and

should include some preliminary time for the child and interviewer to establish a
rapport.

The interview plan should address: (1) who will be present in the

interview room;

(2) who will ask questions; (3) who will videotape the

interview; (4) how questions will be formulated; (5) what props are necessary,
such as crayons and paper; (6) when and where the child will take breaks; (7)
who will remain with the child during breaks, and (8) how the preliminary time
will be conducted.
Before conducting the interview with the child, the interviewer should
speak to whomever has been caring for the child and make sure that this
guardian understands the trial process and what may be required of the child,
including any travel arrangements that might be necessary. The investigator
should be familiar with protective measures that might be provided if a child
testifies, and should discuss these protective options with the child’s guardian.
Also, learning about the child’s likes, dislikes, or hobbies may help to establish a
rapport during the interview.
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If the child has seen a counselor or psychologist, the interviewer should
also meet with him for advice on how best to interview the child. The degree of
trauma that a child has suffered and how the child is coping with it should
influence the investigator’s approach to the interview. The investigator should
discuss the child’s ability to testify in open court against the accused.
Ideally, an investigator should meet with a child at least once before the
actual interview, in order to establish trust.

The meeting should take place in

the presence of another adult whom the child trusts. This adult should explain
who the investigator is and why he needs to see the child. The investigator
should not discuss the sexual abuse at the first meeting, but should engage in
talk and make the child feel at ease.
At the actual interview, the interviewer should use direct and simple
language, including precise anatomical terms. When questioning the child, the
interviewer should: (1) use the active rather than passive voice; (2) avoid
negatives and double negatives; (3) Include only one query per questions;

(4)

Use simple words; (5) Use simple phrases; (6) Use the terms the child uses; and
(7) be alert to any signals that the child is having difficulty understanding the
questions.233

Also, the interviewer should avoid changing the subject or time

frame without making the child aware of the switch.

Nancy E. Walker and Matthew Nguyen, Interviewing the Child Witness: The Do’s and the Don’t’s,
the How’s and the Why’s, 29 Creighton L.Rev. 1587 (1996); quoted in Nancy E. Walker, Forensic
Interviews of Children: The Components of Scientific Validity and Legal Admission, 65 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 149, 165 (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15.]
233

63

In order to prepare a child to testify at trial, the investigator must talk with
the child about the sexual abuse, familiarize the child with the courtroom, and
explain what to expect while testifying. Ideally, the trial preparation should
involve the help of a counselor or psychologist.

The child should know in

advance that the testimony may be given in front of other people.

If possible,

the next several interviews should be conducted in a courtroom setting, in order
to familiarize the child with the formal environment. The child will be more
reliable as a witness if she feels engaged in the proceedings, so the investigator
should try to make the interviews interesting (e.g., making a game, letting the
child ask and answer questions, etc.) If a child gets upset during an interview,
the investigator should remain calm, stop the interview, and try again later.
At some point, the investigator should educate the child about her role in
the trial, about making a solemn oath, and about the necessity of telling the truth
in the courtroom. If the Chamber finds that the child does not understand the
nature of the solemn oath it may allow her testimony to proceed without it;
however, any testimony then given cannot be used as a sole basis for conviction
under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.234

234

See note 81, supra
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C. Use of Written Statements and Closed-circuit/Video Technology
Formal courtroom proceedings can be very intimidating and frightening
for young witnesses, and the fear can be magnified enormously if a child has to
face a defendant who sexually assaulted her.

In recent years, the ICTY has

allowed alternatives to live oral testimony for vulnerable witnesses, including
written statements and testimony via closed-circuit television and video. The
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence no longer state a preference for live oral
testimony, but instead allow written statements to be used “where the interests
of justice allow.”235 Rule 92 bis (Proof of Facts Other than by Oral Evidence) was
adopted by the ICTY in 2000, allowing a Trial Chamber to admit written
statements into evidence that contain evidence normally given orally. The ICTR
has been less willing to accept written statements when live witnesses are
available236, but does also allow the use of closed-circuit television and video.237
Victims of sexual violence are among the most vulnerable of witnesses,
and child victims of sexual attacks are doubly vulnerable. As long as alternatives
to live testimony are permitted by the Tribunals, they should be used liberally to
prevent child victims of sexual assault from having to be in the same room as
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ICTY Rules, supra note 29, and ICTR Rules, supra note 50, Rule 89(F) (General Provisions).
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See note 96, supra.
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ICTR Rules, supra note 50, Rule 75(B)(iii).
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their assailants. A child’s testimony is more likely to be reliable if it is given
under conditions that are free from stress and fear.

V. Prior Sexual Conduct in Evidence
A. ICTY/ ICTR Statutes Forbid Evidence of a Rape Victim’s Sexual History
Under Rule 96 of both the ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, evidence of a rape victim’s previous sexual history is not admissible.
This rule was designed to prevent victims of sexual assaults from being harassed
or embarrassed by defendants. Evidence of a rape victim’s prior sexual conduct
is widely considered to be irrelevant to the circumstances of rape, as well as
being unduly invasive and possibly prejudicial to the victim. Forbidding such
evidence from being admitted increases the likelihood that rape victims will be
willing to testify at the Tribunals.

VI. Sentencing Issues
When the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals began to indict
suspected war criminals from the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, there was
little precedent for sentencing those convicted of rape or sexual assault. Since the
military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo did not generally prosecute sexual
66

violence, the Tribunals have had to develop their own fledgling sentencing
policies for war crimes involving sexual violence.238

A. Sentencing Guidelines Used by the ICTY and ICTR
The ICTY has concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of the former
Yugoslavia over serious violations of international humanitarian law.239

ICTY

Trial Chambers have recourse to the general sentencing practices in the judicial
system of the former Yugoslavia.240 The ICTR has concurrent jurisdiction with
the Rwandan courts, and has recourse to the sentencing practices of the domestic
judicial system.241 ICTR Trial Chambers have recourse to the general sentencing
practices in the domestic courts of Rwanda, with the notable exception of the
death penalty.242

B. Comparison of ICTY and ICTR Sentencing Rules
The Tribunals operate with the sentencing system used in most civil law
jurisdictions, whereby sentencing takes place as part of the judgment phase of a
See e.g., Mark A. Drumbl and Kenneth S. Gallant, Sentencing Policies and Practices in the
International Criminal Tribunals, 15 Fed. Sent. R. 140, 140-141 (2002). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 16.]
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ICTY Statute, supra note 9, at art. 9(1).

240

Id.
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Id. at art. 8.

242

ICTY Statute, supra note 9, at art. 23(1).
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trial.243 The maximum sentence that may be handed down in either Tribunal is
life imprisonment.244 Although the death penalty is allowed under Rwandan
domestic law, it is not available to the ICTR.245 Both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes
provide that the gravity of the offense and individual circumstances should be
taken into account in sentencing, and the Trial Chambers of both Tribunals are
allowed to consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.246 Defendants
can also be credited with time they have already served.247 The ICTY and ICTR
Statutes both provide that judges will indicate if sentences are to be served
concurrently or consecutively, and both allow Trial Chambers to impose a single
sentence that reflects the sum total of a defendant’s criminal conduct.

C. Comparison of ICTY and ICTR Sentencing Practices
A sentence handed down by a Trial Chamber for a case involving sexual
violence may not provide much guidance for another Chamber passing sentence
on a similar case. Since the Chambers have the discretion to give out a single
sentence reflecting all of a defendant's crimes, the Tribunal judgments rarely
discuss the sentence that each individual crime of sexual violence should receive.

243

See Drumbl and Gallant, supra note 238, at 143.

244

ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 24(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 10, art. 23(1).
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ICTR Statute, supra note 10, at art. 23(1).
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ICTY Rules, supra note 29, and ICTR Rules, supra note 50, Rule 101 (Penalties).
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This lack of guidance makes sentencing difficult and extremely subjective for
Tribunal judges, who are allowed to consider (but are not strictly bound by) the
sentencing guidelines of domestic courts.
Total sentences for defendants convicted of sexual violence have ranged
from three years to life imprisonment at the ICTY (Sikirica et al. to Stakic), while
sentences for similar defendants at the ICTR have ranged from 12 years to life
imprisonment. (Ruggiu to e.g., Akayesu.) The ICTY has convicted 34 defendants
in total and the ICTR 11; of these, 13 ICTY defendants and six ICTR defendants
have been convicted of charges relating to sexual violence.

Excluding one life

sentence, the average sentence for ICTY defendants convicted of rape and related
crimes is 13.41 years.

Among the five ICTR defendants convicted of crimes

relating to sexual violence, three received life sentences and two received
sentences of 12 and 15 years, respectively.
Only a small number of defendants have been given individual sentences
for rape and sexual assault. For crimes against humanity, defendants have been
given sentences of 15 years for rape,248 and 10 years for other inhumane acts.249
For grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, sentences have included seven to

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Sentence, No. ICTR-96-4-I (Oct. 2, 1998), Count 13. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
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Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Sentence, supra note 248, Count 14; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Chamber I,
Sentencing Judgment, No. IT-94-1-T (July 14, 1997), Count 11. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 20.]
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15 years for torture or inhuman treatment,250 and seven to nine years for willfully
causing great suffering.251 For violations of the laws or customs of war,
defendants have been sentenced to seven to nine years for cruel treatment,252 to
10 to 15 years for torture,253 and to 8 years for outrages upon personal dignity.254
As discussed in Section II, several defendants have pled guilty to the
charge of crimes against humanity (persecution) involving sexual violence, in
exchange for the dropping of other charges.255

The sentences for these

defendants have ranged from three to 15 years, with an average sentence of 9.4
years.256

Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al. (“Celebici”), Opinion and Judgment, supra note 122, Counts 18, 21,
and 44; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Chamber II, Sentencing Judgment, No. IT-94-1-T (Nov. 11,
1999), Count 8. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22.]
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Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al. (“Celebici”), Opinion and Judgment, supra note 122, Count 38;
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Chamber II, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 250, Count 9.
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Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al. (“Celebici”), Opinion and Judgment, supra note 122, Count 39;
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Chamber I, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 249, Count 9.
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Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al. (“Celebici”), Opinion and Judgment, supra note 122, Counts 19 and
20; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Opinion and Judgment, supra note 64, Count 13.
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See note 135, supra.

Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al. (“Keraterm”), Sentencing Judgment, IT-95-8 (Nov. 13, 2001)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 34]; Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavic,
Sentencing Judgment, supra note 104; Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Judgment, supra note 136; and
Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 101.
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D. Controversial Issues in Sentencing
There have been many complaints about the sentencing practices of the
Tribunals, particularly when sentences for sexual violence are involved.

The

ICTY’s sentences are perceived to be inordinately light in some parts of the
world, given the gravity of war crimes and the expense of holding trials at the
Tribunals. Criticism has been especially strong from the United States, where
sentences tend to be longer for sexual offenses and served in more unpleasant
conditions. The ICTR’s sentences have tended to be longer, given the convictions
for genocide and associated crimes with larger penalties.
Some scholars have argued that the practice of concurrent sentencing
makes individual sentences for sexual violence meaningless.257 For example,
Delic’s 15-year sentence for rape as torture is entirely subsumed within his 20year sentence for willful killing and murder, and Mucic will serve his eleven
distinct seven-year sentences within the space of seven years.258 In such cases, a
conviction for sexual violence makes no discernable impact on the defendants’
punishment. Increasing the penalties for sexual crimes, avoiding the use of
concurrent sentences, or incorporating sexual crimes into a single sentence
would ameliorate this problem.
Since the ICTR has been forbidden to impose the death penalty, there have
been fears that the Rwandan government will be less likely to cooperate with the
257

See e.g., Askin (1999), supra note 103, at 115.

258

Id.
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Tribunal.

Some commentators have noted that lower-level participants in

genocide may consequently receive harsher penalties from the domestic
Rwandan courts than the masterminds and top generals behind the ethnic
violence. This result strikes many scholars as unfair. However, many countries
that support the Tribunals have abolished the death penalty in their own
domestic courts, so strong international support remains for the ICTR’s death
penalty restriction.

VII. Judicial Impartiality and Gender Bias
A question of impartiality and possible gender bias arose in the Furundzija
case, in connection with Judge Florence Mumba’s participation in the U.N.’s
Commission on the Status of Women.259

Because the Commission had

condemned the rapes in the former Yugoslavia and advocated the prosecution of
sexual violence, Furundzija claimed that Judge Mumba was using her judicial
position to promote an agenda of women’s rights.260

259

The defendant argued that

Kelly Dawn Askin, Women’s Issues in International Criminal Law: Recent Developments and the
Potential Contribution of the ICC, in Dinah Shelton (ed.), International Crimes, Peace, and Human
Rights: The Role of the International Criminal Court (2000), at 56-7. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 7.]
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the judge had been biased due to her feminist views, and sought to disqualify
her and vacate his conviction.261
Furundzija also suggested that Judge Mumba was colluding with the
prosecuting attorney, a legal advisor, and others because they had all
participated in the Commission on the Status of Women or the Beijing
Conference on sexual violence.262

As Askin states, “The defense clearly

insinuated that women judges, particularly women who have attempted to
redress human rights violations against women, cannot be impartial because
they are predisposed to promote a feminist agenda, and therefore they should be
recused from adjudicating any cases involving violence against women.”263
Unfortunately, no decision was made on the merits of Furundzija’s application,
as it was denied on a technicality.264 Therefore, no light was shed on the issue of
whether a judge’s personal interest in women’s rights could lead to gender bias
against a defendant. A ruling that a judge’s advocacy of women’s rights could
be construed as impartiality would be devastating, as it would drastically limit
the gender-sensitive input of female judges and Tribunal staff.
This exception aside, concerns about gender bias have generally worked
the other way, and women’s advocates have often been concerned that gender
261

Askin (2000), supra note 259, at 56-7.
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Askin (2000), supra note 261, at 56-7.
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crimes were not taken seriously under international law. When the International
Military Tribunals were established following the Second World War, the rape of
civilians was widely thought to be deplorable, but was not generally prosecuted
(except in conjunction with other crimes).265 This reluctance to prosecute was
due to the attitude that rapes and sexual assaults were private acts rather than
war crimes, and that they were also less important offenses.266

It was also

thought that public trials for rape would be too embarrassing and personal for
the participants.
When the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals were first created, the Office
of the Prosecutor was similarly reluctant to investigate and include charges of
sexual violence in the indictments due to remnants of the same attitudes.
However, the international outcry over media reports of mass rape in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda spurred the Prosecutor to charge defendants for sexual
violence. The participation of women in the Tribunals as judges, investigators,
prosecutors, and legal advisors has had a strong impact on the gender-conscious
prosecution of sexual violence.267

A prime example is the role of Judge

Navanethem Pillay in amending the Akayesu indictment to include charges of
sexual violence, and in developing broader definitions of rape and sexual
violence during the trial. A small number of female judges have been invaluable
265

See Campanaro, supra note 2, at 2559.

266

Id.

267

Id. at 2564.
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in shaping the jurisprudence of rape and sexual assault, and in strengthening the
human rights of women. Women have also served as heads of the Registry, the
Judges Chamber, and the Office of the Prosecutor for the Tribunals, and have
helped to expand the jurisprudence of gender crimes in those capacities.268

268

See Askin (2000), supra note 259, at 47.
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APPENDIX A:
Convictions and Sentences for Crimes involving Sexual Violence
Defendant

Count of indictment

Guilty/ Not Guilty

Sentence (if individual)

Genocide (ICTY Art. 4/ ICTR Art. 2)
(a)

Genocide;

Akayesu

(1)

GUILTY

Krajisnik & Plavsic

(1)

(Dismissed due to plea bargain)

Musema

(1)

GUILTY

Niyitegeka

(1)

GUILTY

Semanza

(1)

NOT GUILTY

Serushago

(1)

(Pled GUILTY)

Stakic

(1)*

NOT GUILTY

(*Alternate charge--> complicity in genocide- NOT GUILTY)

(b)

Conspiracy to commit genocide;

Musema

(3)

NOT GUILTY

Niyitegeka

(3)

GUILTY

Ruggiu

(1)

(Dismissed)

(c)

Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;

Ruggiu

(2)

(Pled GUILTY)

Semanza

(2)

NOT GUILTY

12 years (concurrent)

(e)

Complicity in genocide.

Akayesu

(2)

NOT GUILTY

Krajisnik & Plavsic

(2)

(Dismissed due to plea bargain)

Musema

(2)

NOT GUILTY

Niyitegeka

(2)

NOT GUILTY

Ruggiu

(3)

(Dismissed)

Semanza

(3)

GUILTY

Crimes Against Humanity (ICTY Art. 5/ ICTR Art. 3)
(b)

Extermination;

Akayesu

(3)

GUILTY

Musema

(5)

GUILTY

Niyitegeka

(6)

GUILTY

Ruggiu

(6)

(Dismissed)

Semanza

(5)

GUILTY

Serushago

(3)

(Pled GUILTY)

Stakic

(4)

GUILTY

Kunarac

(14)

(Dismissed)

Kunarac

(18)

GUILTY

Kovac

(22)

GUILTY

(c)

Enslavement;

Life imprisonment

(f)

Torture;

Kunarac

(1)

GUILTY

Kunarac

(5)

NOT GUILTY

Radic

(14)

(Dismissed)

Serushago

(4)

(Pled GUILTY)

Semanza

(11)

GUILTY

Vukovic

(21)

NOT GUILTY

Vukovic

(33)

GUILTY

Akayesu

(13)

GUILTY

Cesic

(8)

(Pled GUILTY)

Kunarac

(2)

GUILTY

Kunarac

(6)

NOT GUILTY

Kunarac

(9)

GUILTY

Kunarac

(15)

(Dismissed)

Kunarac

(19)

GUILTY

Kovac

(23)

GUILTY

Musema

(7)

GUILTY--> Found NOT GUILTY on appeal

Nikolic

(4)

(Pled GUILTY)

Niyitegeka

(7)

NOT GUILTY

Radic

(15)

(Dismissed)

Semanza

(8)

NOT GUILTY

(g)

Rape;
15 years

(Sentencing 11/2003)

(g)

Rape; (cont’d)

Semanza

(10)

GUILTY

Serushago

(5)

(Withdrawn)

Tadic

(4)

(Withdrawn)

Vukovic

(22)

NOT GUILTY

Vukovic

(34)

GUILTY

(h)

Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;

Sikirica et al.Dosen

(Pled GUILTY)

5 years

Kolundzija

(Pled GUILTY)

3 years

(Pled GUILTY)

11 years

Krajisnik & Plavsic

(2)

Plavsic
Kvocka et al.

(1)
Kvocka

GUILTY

Prcac

GUILTY

Kos

GUILTY

Radic

GUILTY

Zigic

GUILTY

Nikolic

(1)

(Pled GUILTY)

(Sentencing 11/2003)

Ruggiu

(5)

(Pled GUILTY)

12 years (concurrent)

Semanza

(6)

NOT GUILTY

Sikirica

(Pled GUILTY)

15 years

(h)

Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (cont’d.)

Stakic

(6)

GUILTY

Tadic

(1)

(Withdrawn)

Todorovic

(i)

(Pled GUILTY)

10 years

Other inhumane acts.

Akayesu

(14)

GUILTY

Kvocka, et al.

(2)

(Dismissed)

Musema

(6)

NOT GUILTY

Nikolic

(5)

(Pled GUILTY)

Niyitegeka

(8)

GUILTY

Tadic

(11)

GUILTY

10 years

(Sentencing 11/2003)

10 years

Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention (ICTY Art. 2)
(b) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
Delic

(18)

GUILTY

15 years

Delic

(21)

GUILTY

15 years

Delic et al.

(44)

Delic

NOT GUILTY

Delalic

NOT GUILTY

Mucic

GUILTY

Tadic

(2)

(Withdrawn)

7 years

Tadic

(8)

Inapplicable --> Found GUILTY on appeal

9 years

(c) Willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;

Delic et al.

(38)

Delalic

NOT GUILTY

Delic

NOT GUILTY

Mucic

GUILTY

Tadic

(9)

7 years

Inapplicable--> Found GUILTY on appeal

9 years

Violations of the Laws/ Customs of War (ICTY Art. 3)
(a) Employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering;
Cruel treatment -

Geneva Conventions of 1949

Delic

(20)

(Dismissed)

Delic

(23)

(Dismissed)

Delic et al. (39)
Delalic
Delic
Mucic

NOT GUILTY
NOT GUILTY
GUILTY

7 years

NOT GUILTY
NOT GUILTY
GUILTY

7 years

Delic et al. (45)
Delalic
Delic
Mucic

Cruel treatment -

Geneva Conventions of 1949 (cont’d.)

Tadic

(3)

(Withdrawn)

Tadic

(10)

GUILTY

9 years

Rape

Kunarac & Kovac

(4)

Kunarac

GUILTY

Kunarac

(8)

NOT GUILTY

Kunarac

(10)

GUILTY

Kunarac

(12)

GUILTY

Kunarac

(16)

(Dismissed)

Kunarac

(20)

GUILTY

Kovac

(24)

GUILTY

Vukovic

(23)

NOT GUILTY

Vukovic

(36)

GUILTY

Delic

(19)

GUILTY

15 years

Delic

(22)

GUILTY

15 years

Furundzija

(13)

GUILTY

10 years

Kunarac

(3)

GUILTY

Kunarac

(7)

NOT GUILTY

Kunarac

(11)

GUILTY

Torture

Torture (cont’d.)
Radic

(16)

GUILTY

Vukovic

(24)

NOT GUILTY

Vukovic

(35)

GUILTY

Outrages upon person dignity
Furundzija

(14)

GUILTY

Kunarac

(17)

(Dismissed)

Kunarac

(21)

NOT GUILTY

Kovac

(25)

GUILTY

Kvocka et al.

(3)

(Dismissed)

Humiliating or degrading treatment
Cesic
(7)

8 years

(Pled GUILTY)

Violations of Common Art. 3 & Addt’l Protocol II (ICTR Art. 4)
(a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in
particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form
of corporal punishment;
Musema

(8)

NOT GUILTY

Niyitegeka

(9)

NOT GUILTY

Semanza

(7)

NOT GUILTY

Semanza

(13)

NOT GUILTY

(e) Outrages upon personal dignity
Akayesu

(15)

NOT GUILTY

Musema

(9)

NOT GUILTY

Niyitegeka

(10)

NOT GUILTY

Semanza

(9)

NOT GUILTY

Sentences for Defendants Convicted of Crimes involving
Sexual Violence

Defendant

Sentence

Type of Sentence

Akayesu

Life imprisonment

Individual sentence (concurrent)

Delic

20 years (--> 18 on appeal)

Individual sentence (concurrent)

Furundzija

10 & 8 years

Individual sentence (concurrent)

Kovac

20 years

Single sentence

Kunarac

28 years

Single sentence

Mucic

7 years (--> 9 years on appeal)

Individual sentences (concurrent)

Musema

Life imprisonment

Single sentence

Niyitegeka

Life imprisonment

Single sentence

Plavsic

11 years

Individual sentence

Ruggiu

12 years

Individual sentences (concurrent)

Serushago

15 years

Single sentence

Sikirica et al.3 Defendants:

15, 5, and 3 years

Individual sentences

Stakic

Life imprisonment

Single sentence

Tadic

20 years

Individual sentences (concurrent)

+ 2 9-year sentences on appeal (concurrent w/ all previous sentences)
Todorovic

10 years

Individual sentence

Vukovic

12 years

Single sentence

